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Abstract
By constructing an intra-industry trade model with the division of labor within
rms, this study shows that opening up to trade improves rm productivity through
promoting the division of labor. The division of labor is limited not by the size of
each market but by the number of export markets that rms enter. Reallocation
of labor across rms based on free-entry condition, xed export costs, and constant
markup rate plays a key role behind this result. Firms enter the export markets in
the ascending order of entry costs. As trade costs decrease, rms enter more export
markets if the number of markets does not reach the upper bound. Hence, the division
of labor is essentially limited by trade costs. This implication brings new insight to
Adam Smith's theorem.
Keywords: the number of export markets that rms enter; division of labor within
rms; labor reallocation
JEL classication numbers : F12
1 Introduction
Adam Smith (1776) indicated the importance of productivity improvement induced through
the division of labor within a rm using the example of a pin factory; \As rms input
more labor, the rms' productivity increase." Then, Adam Smith suggested a famous
proposition called Adam Smith's theorem: \The division of labor is limited by the extent
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of the market." Many economists have justied Adam Smith's theorem theoretically and
empirically.1)2) In particular, these empirical studies justify Adam Smith's theorem for
both the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors.3)
These studies address the autarky economy. How can this theorem be extended to
an open economy? Little is known of this; however, one exception is Chaney and Ossa
(2013) who indicated that an increase in market size (labor force) theoretically promotes
the division of labor within rms. Their model implicitly indicates that an increase in the
market size of each country promotes the division of labor; i.e., the division of labor is
limited by the size of each market. This is a new insight for the division of labor within
rms in the context of intra-industry trade.
Chaney and Ossa (2013) do not treat xed costs, and they evoke labor reallocation
across rms based on a pro-competition eect, such as Krugman (1979). Under xed costs,
constant markup rate, and free entry, considering a mechanism by which rm productivity
increases according to the extent of the division of labor and excess prots causes new
entrants; to what extent rms choose the division of labor and what that extent depends
on? Furthermore, when rms must pay xed export costs, how do these costs and the
number of export markets that rms enter aect the rm's decision? This study shows a
simple trade model that investigates these problems.
We construct a model that is quite similar to standard intra-industry trade models
presented by Krugman (1980), except for the division of labor, xed export costs, and
symmetric multi-countries. We treat the division of labor within rms similar to that by
Chaney and Ossa (2013). Chaney and Ossa (2013) succeeded in formalizing Adam Smith's
(1776) pin factory story. We assume that rms enter export markets in the ascending
order of entry costs. This assumption plays a key role in determining the number of export
markets that rms enter.
This study's main results are as follows. Under positive xed export costs and free-
entry condition without pro-competition eect, opening up to trade makes surviving rms
1) This proposition is interpreted often as the division of labor not only within rms but also across rms
within an industry and across industries. For example, Ethier (1982) treats the division of labor as an
expansion of the varieties of intermediate goods. In this study, the division of labor is treated as a narrower
task set in which each worker engages.
2) For example, Stigler (1951) interprets Adam Smith's theorem as the relation between market size and
vertical integration (an increase in market size raises the number of specialized rms). The study of the
division of labor reported by Stigler (1951) is supported by Levy (1984). Levy (1984) supports Stigler's
(1951) hypothesis using data from 38 manufacturing industries. Borghans and Weel (2006) suggested rm
productivity improvements induced by the division of labor within rms through communication technology
adoption, which reduces the coordination cost within rms. Edwards and Starr (1987), Swanson (1999),
and Becker and Murphy (1992) present theoretical analyses.
3) Baumgardner (1988) indicated that the more populous counties have more medical specialists. Garcano
and Hubbard (2008) presented similar results for law rms.
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promote the division of labor. The division of labor becomes stronger as the number
of export markets that rms enter increases; i.e., the division of labor is limited by the
number of export markets that rms enter but not by the size of each market. As trade
costs decrease, rms enter more export markets if the number of markets does not reach
the upper bound. Hence, the division of labor is essentially limited by trade costs.
There are quite few papers that analyze international trade by explicitly incorporating
the division of labor within rms. Kamei (2013), Francois (1987), and Zadef (2013) are
exceptions. Similar to this study, Kamei (2013) incorporated Chaney and Ossa's (2013)
division of labor into a general oligopolistic equilibrium model with a variable markup rate
and demonstrated an increase in the number of trading countries promotes the division of
labor. Francois (1987) adopted Edwards and Starr's (1987) division of labor and analyzed
trade in services and its eect on the division of labor. Zadeh (2013) presented a model in
which there are two types of workers and heterogeneity of rms. Zadeh (2013) focused on
relative specialization and skill premium through trade liberalization. Unlike these studies,
our study focuses on the relation between optimal entry for export markets and the division
of labor within rms. Our results described above are in contrast to Adam Smith's theorem
and the result of Chaney and Ossa (2013) and Kamei (2013) that the division of labor is
limited by the size of each market. In Chaney and Ossa (2013) and Kamei (2013), the
division of labor is promoted through labor reallocation across rms pro-competition eect.
However, our model does not include the pro-competition eect. Furthermore, in our
model, when trade costs decrease, rms enter more export markets. Hence, the division
of labor is essentially limited by trade costs. This implication brings new insight to Adam
Smith's theorem. This result can not be given by the model of Chaney and Ossa (2013)
because their markup rate does not depend on the number of rms. Our study's results
are dierent from Zadef (2013). Zadef (2013) indicated that trade liberalization promotes
relative specialization but has nothing special to imply about the relation between the
optimal number of export markets and the division of labor. Our model is simpler and
more analytical.
The topic of this study{the division of labor within rms promoted by trade{can be
associated with the restructuring of rm organization by trade.4)5) These studies reveal a
4) In more general, this research line is included in trade-induced rm productivity improvement. Yeaple
(2005) and Bustos (2011) studied technology adoption. McLaren (2000) studied productivity improvement
through vertical restructuring. Clerides, Lach, and Tybout (1998) and Martins and Yang (2009) empirically
studied trade-induced rm productivity improvement. There is no consensus on whether improvements
to rm productivity are induced by trade. A survey by Wagner (2007) indicated that this eect is mixed
and unclear. However, Martins and Yang (2009) indicated that many empirical studies recognize rm
productivity improvements induced by trade, considering more than 30 papers.
5) This research line is dierent from the trade-induced industry productivity improvement of Melitz
(2003). He focused on average industry productivity with heterogeneous rms. In contrast to this, our
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composition of rm productivity from the viewpoint of rm organization.6)
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 analyzes autarkic equilibrium.
Section 3 analyzes how opening up to trade promotes the division of labor and increases
welfare. Section 4 analyzes how trade liberalization promotes the division of labor. Finally,
we present the conclusion and Appendix.
2 The model
We introduce the division of labor into the trade model of monopolistic competition with
xed export costs. The setup of the model is based on the idea of Chaney and Ossa (2013).
In this section, we set up the model of an autarky economy.
2.1 Households
There are L units of household, and each household supplies one unit of labor inelasti-
cally at wage rate w. The preference of each consumer is given by a constant elastic-
ity of substitution (CES) utility function over a continuum of goods indexed by : U =R
2 c()
d
1=
; 0 <  < 1, where the measure of the set  represents the mass of available
dierentiated goods, and c() represents the consumption of variety . From standard util-
ity maximization, the price index can be obtained as follows: P =
R
2 (p())
1  d
1=(1 )
,
where  = 1=(1  ) > 1 is the elasticity of the substitution between any two varieties and
also represents the price elasticity of demand for each variety.
2.2 Firm organization
We introduce the division of labor within rms in a similar manner to that done by Chaney
and Ossa (2013) for the reason as follows.7) Traditional production management, which
promotes the division of labor and production on a large scale, is the scientic management
study focuses on rm productivity with homogeneous rms in productivity.
6) Caliendo and Rossi-Hansberg (2012) indicated that trade liberalization increases the number of layers
of management and raises rm productivity by calibrating the model to the U.S. economy. Cu~nat and
Guadalupe (2009) indicated that higher foreign competition leads to more incentive provision in various
ways, which is compatible with recent trends in compensation structures of U.S. executives. Davidson
et al. (2013) provided empirical evidence by using the matched employer-employee data in Sweden that
multinational enterprises (MNEs) possess greater skill intensity than local rms and non-MNEs. Then,
they present a model explaining the empirical results.
7) In addition to Chaney and Ossa (2013), some papers formalized the division of labor. Edwards and
Starr (1987) presented a model in which the division of labor is not a sucient condition for increasing
returns to scale. Swanson (1999) presented a quite simple model that analyzes the relation among hu-
man capital investment, the division of labor, and rm productivity. Becker and Murphy (1992) showed
explicitly that the cost of promoting the division of labor is coordination cost.
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advocated by Frederick Taylor. However, today, team production is important in many
industries, as reported by Daft (2000). Chaney and Ossa (2013) allowed such a production
management approach explicitly, and hence, we also adopt it.
Each rm produces a variety of dierentiated nal goods. As for the production of
goods, we modify the model developed by Chaney and Ossa (2013). Many tasks are
sequentially distributed over the set [0; 2] for each rm. One unit of nal good is produced
by inputting one unit of preliminary good for task set [0; 2]. A rm assigns these tasks
to t teams, where t 2 R+. Because the teams are symmetric, an identical range of task
subsets is assigned to each team. One unit of preliminary good for a certain task set [!; !]
is produced by inputting the following units of labor:
l(!; !) =
1
2

Z !
!
j!c   !jd!

| {z }
Area of two right-angled triangles
; !c 2 [0; 2];  > 0; (1)
where (! + !)=2 denotes this team's core competency, and  denotes the team's burden
parameter.8) Core competency is a task that the team is most suited to undertake. As 
is high, certain task sets need more labor force.  can be interpreted as the diculty of
multitasking.
This implies that the larger  is, the less ecient is the assigning of many task sets to
one team: a decrease in  raises the team's performance. Figure 1 illustrates this feature
for task set [0; 4=t] when t is a positive integer. The integral term in (1) corresponds to the
area of two right-angled triangles formed in linear symmetry with respect to the vertical
direction shown in Figure 1.9)
Let lprejunit denote labor requirements for producing one unit of preliminary good for
the task set [0; 2]. By combining (1) for each team, lprejunit can be obtained as follows :10)
lprejunit = t
 Z 1=t
0
!d!
!
| {z }
labor input per one team
=

2t
: (2)
(2) indicates that as the number of teams increases, labor input per one team converges
8) In Chaney and Ossa (2013), the rm assigns a core competency to each team; i.e., the core competency
is endogenously determined. We also derive the core competency endogenously in Appendix A.
9) For the assumption of l(!; !), Chaney and Ossa (2013) adopt a more general form, l(!; !) =
1
2
R !
!

!+!
2   !

d!, where  > is a positive parameter. By formulating l(!; !) the way as (1), we
can make the model highly tractable. See Appendix A for the generality and validity of the technology in
(1).
10) On the right hand side of (1), by dividing the integral term by two, we get a quite simple form for the
units of labor. See Appendix A for the derivation.
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Figure 1: sequential task structure
with order 2 to 0 from
R 1=t
0
!d! = =(2t2), while the number of teams diverges with order
1 to +1. Hence, as the number of teams increases, lprejunit decreases.
Organizing one team requires f(> 0) units of labor, which is interpreted as coordination
costs.11) Then, y units of nal goods is produced for a given number of teams, t, by inputting
the following units of labor on production divisions, l(t; y) = tf + ylprejunit = tf + y=(2t).
Each rm selects the number of teams t such that the above labor input l(t; y) is mini-
mized. In this problem, the rm experiences a trade-o among productivity improvements
by increasing the number of teams and costs of organizing teams. The optimal number of
teams t is t(y) = [y=(2f)]1=2.
Each rm inputs labor into the production divisions and a further fd(> 0) units of
labor into the management division, where fd(> 0) is xed and wfd represents overhead
production costs. Total labor input is l + fd.
Combining l(t; y) and t(y) gives the total cost function under the optimal organization
as follows:
TC(y) = wl(y) + wfd = w(2fy)
1=2 + wfd: (3)
This cost function shows that the rm's technology exhibits increasing returns to scale and
that marginal cost is decreasing at all levels of output.
From l(t; y), we can obtain the production function as follows: y = l2=(2f). The
marginal productivity of labor MPL(l) is given by MPL(l) = dy=dl = l=(f). This shows
that the expansion of labor input increases marginal productivity. Furthermore, from t(y),
MPL(l), and the production function, we can obtain MPL = 2t

. We can conrm that
11) f can be interpreted as mid-level management costs. Because each team specializes in a certain task
set, the rm needs coordinators. Becker and Murphy (1992) emphasized that coordination cost is the brake
for the division of labor.
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the division of labor raises rm productivity. In the same manner as above, we can get
MC = w=(2t). The division of labor reduces marginal cost.
2.3 Equilibrium allocation
We analyze the rm's prot maximization problem in a monopolistic competitive market.
Each rm experiences a residual demand curve with constant elasticity  and therefore sets
p = MC(y), where   =(   1) and MC(y)  dTC(y)=dy. Using l(t; y), this optimal
pricing rule is written by the PPA schedule as follows:
PPA :
p
w
=

2

2f
y
1=2
: (4)
Firms can enter and exit freely. This gives zero prot  = 0; this is written by p = AC(y),
where AC(y)  TC(y)=y. Using l(t; y), this free-entry condition is written by the FEA
schedule as follows:
FEA :
p
w
=

2f
y
1=2
+
fd
y
: (5)
(4) and (5) characterize (y; p=w) at equilibrium as follows: yA = f
2
d=(2fB
2), and (p=w)A =
B(B + 1)2f=fd, where B  =2   1 and subscript \A" represents variables in autarkic
equilibrium.
Hereafter, we assume Assumption 1 given below to ensure the unique internal solution.
Assumption 1. 12) 0 < B <1, i.e., 2 <  <1 (1 <  < 2) and fd > 0 hold.
We can immediately obtain the next proposition from yA and (p=w)A.
Proposition 1. Under Assumption 1, a unique internal solution in which y > 0 and
p=w > 0 exists.
Note that if fd = 0 holds, then the internal solution does not exist.
13) Hence, we need
to assume fd > 0. Even if fd > 0, under   2, y !1; i.e., the internal solution requires a
suciently low elasticity of substitution among varieties (consumers value variety strongly).
Figure 2 illustrates the features of an autarkic equilibrium. The gure has a unique
intersection between the FEA and PPA curves at point EA where (y; p=w) = (yA; (p=w)A).
The PPA curve is cut by the FEA curve only once. This ensures a unique internal solu-
tion.14)
12) This internal condition makes us reconsider rm technology as represented by (1). See Appendix A
for details. However, we will adopt technology in (1) and Assumption 1 for analytical simplicity.
13) When fd = 0 and B = 0, equilibrium output y is not determined. When fd = 0 and B 6= 0, equilibrium
output y is zero or approaches positive innity.
14) The characteristic of Figure 2 is supported by Appendix B.
7
Figure 2: Autarky and Tarding equilibrium in (y; p=w) space.
Substitute yA into t(y) to yield the equilibrium level of t: tA = fd=(2fB). The equi-
librium level of l is obtained by substituting yA and tA into l(t; y): lA = fd=B. Then,
substitute lA into MPL(l) to yield MPLA = fd=(fB). This equation implies that
MPLA = 2tA= = lA=(f). Further, (w=p)A = tA=[(B + 1)] = lA=[2(B + 1)f ] holds.
At equilibrium, labor productivity and real wages are proportional to the number of teams
and the labor input on production divisions.
Now, we can completely characterize the equilibrium allocation by determining the
number of varieties. Labor market clearing condition L = M(l + fd) gives the following
equilibrium number of varieties MA using lA: MA = [B=(B + 1)](L=fd).
15)
From MPLA and MA, the following proposition is immediately obtained.
Proposition 2. Under Assumption 1, an expansion of aggregate labor force does not pro-
mote the division of labor and thus does not raise rm productivity and only raises the
number of rms.
Proposition 2 means that the division of labor is not limited by the size of the market.16)
Remember that output yA is completely characterized by PP and FE conditions. These
conditions do not depend on market size L. Hence, yA also does not depend on market
size. This result is in contrast to Chaney and Ossa (2013) and Kamei (2014) in which PP
conditions depend on market size L, and then, labor reallocation across rms based on
pro-competition eect occurs similar to Krugman (1979).
15) To obtain MA, we use labor market clearing condition and do not use income-expenditure clearing
condition of each household because this condition is redundant on this equilibrium.
16) Proposition 2 implies that Proposition 1 holds even if L ! 1. This is because all the eects of an
increase in labor forces are not absorbed into an increase in demand for each variety but in the number of
rms.
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The mechanism behind Proposition 2 is explained as follows. In the short run, the
number of rms cannot be adjusted. An expansion of labor force increases employed
workers in each rm and hence improves rm productivity; then, rms obtain excess prots.
However, in the long run with free entry and exit, new rms enter and recruit some workers
from incumbent rms. Therefore, the eect of productivity improvements is just outset
entirely.
3 Opening up to international trade
We extend the model reported in the previous section to the case of trade among identical
n + 1 countries with xed export costs. The assumption of xed export costs is essential
for the division of labor promoted by trade. We assume n 2 R++ for analytical simplicity.
Without the loss of generality, we focus on the home country's allocation.
3.1 Two types of rm decision processes
Each rm's decision process has two stages. The rst stage is the market entry process. The
second stage is a choice of optimal quantity and price. This rm's optimization problem
can be solved using backward induction. We begin with the second problem. In the second
stage, the number of export markets that rms enter is given.
Each rm experiences two types of trade costs. First, rms must export  2 [1;1)
units of product to send one unit (iceberg trade cost) to a foreign market. Second, to enter
export markets, rms must pay xed costs.17)
Some empirical studies indicate that most rms export to a few markets.18) Hence, it
is natural to think that rms enter export markets in the ascending order of entry costs.
Then, we assume that rms entering n export markets must pay xed costs wnfx, where
  1; i.e., these costs vary across markets and can be interpreted as marker-specic xed
export costs.19) This assumption plays a key role in determining optimal entry.
17) The examples are as follows: collecting information about foreign markets and consumer tastes, adapt-
ing their products to foreign administrative standards, establishing a distribution network, and standard-
izing products to fulll market-specic regulations.
18) Gullstrand (2011) used data from the Swedish food sector and indicated that \only two rms export
to 50 countries or more in a single year while roughly half export to just ten countries or fewer" and \On
average, an exporter sells to 13 countries."
19) Maurseth and Medin (2013) used a survey of Norwegian sea food rms and found that \having exported
to a particular market the previous periods doubles the probability of to the same market in the current
period". They interpret this result as the existence of market-specic sunk export costs. Gullstrand (2011)
used data from the Swedish food sector and indicated that for rms' export decisions, rm destination
eects are more important than unobserved rm characteristics. In particular, they emphasized exchange
rate stability. Blanes-Cristobal et al. (2008) used a survey of Spanish manufacturing rms and indicated
that the costs to enter developed markets are higher (especially the EU) than those of the rest of the world.
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We focus on rms entering n export markets. These rms' output for the home market
is denoted by yd, and each of the foreign markets is denoted by yx. Then, we can dene
the total output of rms as y = yd + nyx.
The rm production function is given by y = l2=(2f), where l represents labor inputs
in production divisions to sell in n+1 markets. This rm's total labor input is l+fd+n
fx.
This gives the marginal product of labor as follows: MPL = l=(f). The total cost
function is given by
TC(y) = w

(2fy)1=2 + fd + n
fx

:
Note that under these technologies, TC(y) < w[(2fyd)
1=2 + fd] + w[(2fyx)
1=2 + nfx]
holds. This implies that each rm's total prots cannot be decomposed into prots from
the home market and those from export markets  6= d + nx.
Price for the home market is denoted by pd and that for the export market as px. Mill
price in the export market is px = pd, from the assumption.
Home consumers buy goods from n foreign countries as the trade-balanced condition
is satised. Home consumers experience all countries' brands and (n=n)M brands, on
average, per one foreign country. Hence, the price index is given by
PT jn =
R
2 (pd())
1  d + n
R
2 [pd(
)]1  d
1=(1 )
, where an asterisk repre-
sents foreign brands.
Accounting for a nal goods market-clearing condition, rm prot maximization is
characterized by optimal price setting (See Appendix C).
3.2 Trading equilibrium and the division of labor promoted by
trade
We dene trading equilibrium in almost the same manner as autarkic equilibrium. However,
we need to account for rms' decisions of export market entry. Subscript \ T " represents
variables in trading equilibrium. Then, we dene trading equilibrium as follows.
Denition 1. We dene trading equilibrium as an equilibrium that satises the conditions
as follows.
(I) Optimal price-setting rules, free-entry conditions, goods market-clearing conditions,
labor market-clearing conditions, and trade-balanced conditions are satised.
(II) No rms have an incentive to deviate from the equilibrium for the number of export
markets that rms enter.
European norms may be quite specic and homogeneous among members. Bugameli and Infante (2003)
used a survey of Italian manufacturing rms and emphasized informational barriers.
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We consider rms' decisions at the second stage (optimal price and output), treating
the positive number of export markets that rms enter n > 0 as given. Firm equilibrium
allocation is characterized by the optimal pricing rule PPjn : pd=w = (=2) (2f=y)
1=2 and
free-entry condition FEjn : pd=w = (2f=y)
1=2+(fd+n
fx)=y. Subscript \ jn " represents
variables being conditional on n. Figure 2 illustrates the features of the trading equilibrium
as point ET jn.
As shown in Figure 2, positive xed export costs nfx shift the FE curve upward.
Note that the free-entry condition holds for the world market as a whole and that the
only dierence between autarky and trading equilibrium conditions is the xed costs term.
This implies that we can obtain yT jn by replacing fd with fd + nfx in yA: yT jn = (fd +
nfx)
2=(2fB2). In the similar manner, we have lT jn = (fd + nfx)=B, tT jn = (fd +
nfx)=(2fB), and MT jn = L=[(2fy)1=2 + fd + nfx]. M represents the number of home
country rms.
We nd yT jn > yA, (w=pd)T jn > (w=pd)A, tT jn > tA, lT jn > lA, MPLT jn > MPLA and
MT jn < MA. MT jn < MA means that some rms exit. tT jn > tA and MPLT jn > MPLA
mean that the division of labor is promoted by opening trade.
Those results are summarized in the proposition as follows.
Proposition 3. Under Assumption 1 and given n > 0, opening up to trade with positive
xed export costs promotes the division of labor.
Proof. From tT jn   tA = (fd + nfx)=(2fB)   fd=(2fB), for all n 2 R++, tT jn > tA.
Q.E.D.
We can explain a mechanism behind this result from a viewpoint of labor reallocation
across rms. In Figure 2, the point EA satises the optimal pricing rule, PPT jn, and not
free entry condition, FET jn. Each of rms has negative prot at the point EA because the
average cost is higher than the price. Hence, on opening up to trade, some rms try to
enter export markets just to survive. These rms must pay xed export costs. To pay these
costs, these rms recruit workers. Firms that succeed in recruiting workers can promote
the division of labor. This recruiting competition raises the real wage rate. This causes
rms that do not succeed in recruiting to exit.
Note that this selection mechanism is dierent from that of Chaney and Ossa (2013)
and Kamei (2014). Their selection mechanism is driven by pro-competition eect similar
to Krugman (1979), in which PP condition depends on market size.
An allocation in a trading equilibrium without trading costs is accorded with that of
an integrated economy's equilibrium because this model does not have a pro-competition
eect. Therefore, Proposition 3 implies Corollary 1 as follows.
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Corollary 1. Under Assumption 1 and given n > 0, opening up to trade without xed
export costs does not raise rm productivity.
Proof. Let fx be zero. For all n 2 R++, tT jn = tA. Q.E.D.
We nd that positive xed export costs are essential for Proposition 3. This mechanism
is parallel to the result in Melitz (2003).20)
From tT jn, we obtain Corollary 2 as follows.
Corollary 2. Under Assumption 1 and given n > 0, as the number of export markets that
rms enter increases, the division of labor becomes stronger.
Proof. From dtT jn=dn = (fd+ n 1fx)=(2fB), for all n 2 R++, dtT jn=dn > 0. Q.E.D.
This corollary means that the division of labor is limited by the number of export markets
that rms enter ; i.e., rms select the optimal division of labor according to the number of
export markets they enter. Free-entry conditions play a key role behind the results. 21)
3.3 Optimal entry for export markets
Next, we consider rms' decisions on the rst stage: the entry process. Firms select the
number of export markets to enter while xing the number of export markets the other
rms enter.
The number of export markets that rms should enter depends on the parameter set.
The optimal number is uniquely determined under certain assumptions, as shown in Propo-
sition 4. To clarify those assumptions, we introduce a function G(n).
Denition 2. We dene function G(n), which is a function of n 2 R as follows: G(n) 
I(n)=H(n), where is, I(n)  1 +  1 n, H(n)  (1 + nfx=fd)2 .
In addition, We dene values nc 2 R++ and ne 2 R++ that satisfy the conditions as
follows: G(nc) = 1, G
0(ne) = 0.
For analytical simplicity, we focus on an equilibrium in which all rms enter the same
number of markets. To focus on such an equilibrium, we impose restrictions on n.
Assumption 2. We assume the condition as follows:
(I) (2  )  1 ) G0(n) < 0.
(II) [(2  ) < 1 ^  = 1 ^ fd < fx 1(2  )] ) n > nc,
20) Melitz's (2003) footnote 24 says \In the absence of such costs (...), opening to trade will not induce
any distributional changes among rms, and heterogeneity will not play an important role."
21) We can interpret a mechanism of this corollary in the same manner as Proposition 3.When n is high,
much of the labor force is concentrated in surviving rms through opening up to trade.
12
(III)

(2  ) < 1 ^  > 1 ^ fd = fx [ 1(2  )] [(  1)=[1  (2  )]] 1
)
n 6= ne,
(IV )

(2  ) < 1 ^  > 1 ^ fd < fx [ 1(2  )] [(  1)[1  (2  )]] 1
)
[n < ne _ G(n) > G(ne)].
(V ) There is a unique  2 (0; 1) such that satises:
a 1 = [I 0(n)=I(n)][H 0(n)=H(n)] [(fd + nfx
)=(fd + n
fx)]
 1.
We introduce Lemmas 1 and 2 to determine nT , as shown in Appendices I and J.
22)
Then, we can obtain Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. The following properties hold.
(I) If and only if Assumption 1, (2 )  1, and (I) of Assumption 2 hold, there is a
unique equilibrium in which all rms enter nT +1 markets, where nT satises I
0(n)=I(n) =
H 0(n)=H(n): partial entry regime.
(II) If and only if Assumption 1, (2  ) < 1, and (II) { (V ) of Assumption 2 hold,
there is a unique equilibrium in which all rms enter n+1 markets; i.e., nT = n: full entry
regime.
Proof. See Appendix L. Q.E.D.
We investigate what each regime demands.23) Whether the full entry or partial entry
regime is satised highly depends on the property of xed export costs distribution. Full
entry regime demands (2  ) < 1, and the partial entry regime demands (2  )  1.
In particular,  = 1 holds only in the case of (2   ) < 1; i.e., when there is no market
specicity for export xed costs, a partial entry regime cannot be achieved. Conversely,
when export xed costs are highly specic, a partial entry regime is achieved.
By using nT in Proposition 4, we can completely characterize the trading equilibrium
nT , cT , c
0
T , yT , (w=pd)T , tT , lT , and MT .
24)
22) Lemma 1 indicates that the numbers of export markets that rms enter are not distributed in a certain
condition. This lemma holds when G(n) > 1 holds; i.e., n is suciently high relative to trade costs  and
fx=fd. Lemma 2 indicates that the equilibrium condition (II) in Denition 1 is satised if all rms enter n
export markets. This lemma holds when an optimal n maximizes G(n). We can interpret this immediately.
The numerator of G(n) I(n) = (1+n1 ) and the denominator of G(n) H(n) = (1+nfx=fd)2  can be
interpreted as entry gain and entry loss, respectively, as explained in Appendix K. Therefore, it is natural
that n maximizes G(n).
23) Both regimes demand G(nT ) > 1 and the maximization of G(n) by nT . G
0(n) < 0 in (I) of Assumption
2 certies G0(nT ) = 0 for nT < n. All conditions in (II) { (IV ) of Assumption 2 are bound when a
combination of variable and xed trade costs are suciently high relative to domestic xed costs. nT of
partial regime demands I 0(nT )=I(nT ) = H 0(nT )=H(nT ). This means that the elasticity of entry gains for
n is equal to the elasticity of entry loss for n.
24) We have already imposed nal goods market-clearing conditions and labor market-clearing conditions
for n+1 countries but have not imposed the income-expenditure clearing condition and the trade-balance
conditions for n+ 1 countries because these conditions are redundant on this equilibrium.
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Though we account decision on the number of export markets rms enter in trading
equilibrium, the following result similar to Proposition 2 holds.
Corollary 3. Under Assumption 1 and 2, uniform expansion of aggregate labor force of
all countries does not promote the division of labor in both regimes.
Proof. From tT jn = (fd+nfx)=(2fB), tT jn does not directly depend on L. Since G(n)
does not depend on labor force L, optimal nT , which maximizes G(n) also does not depend
on labor force L. Hence, tT jn does not depend on L. Q.E.D.
That is, the division of labor is not limited by the size of each market in trading
equilibrium. The free-entry condition has a key role in this result.25)
3.4 Gains from trade
At the trading equilibrium, the real wage rates are identical in all countries, and hence, the
indirect utility function is given by VT = (w=P )T . This leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 5. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, VT > VA.
Proof. We can obtain VT > VA $ G(nT ) > 1 under Assumption 1 (see Appendix D for
the proof). Assumption 2 certies G(n) > 1 (see Appendix L for the proof). Q.E.D.
The necessary condition for optimal entry G(n) > 1 is equivalent to condition VT > VA;
i.e., the optimal entry condition certies gains from opening up to trade.
We next decompose gains from trade. At trading equilibrium, the welfare of each
country VT is given by VT = (w=pd)T [(1 + nT 
1 )MT ]1=( 1) shown in Appendix D. We
dene the eective number of varieties asMW  [(1+nT  1 )MT ]1=( 1), and this represents
the number of varieties consumers buy that are discounted by variable trade costs  .26)
Then, we can decompose gains from trade into changes in real wages (productivity eect)
and change in the eective number of varieties (eective variety eect).
Productivity eect is positive from Proposition 3. In contrast to this, the eective
variety eect is ambiguous; i.e., even if the eective variety eect is negative, the positive
productivity eect dominates this eect on the equilibrium (See Appendix E for details).
25) Proposition 8 of Appendix G indicates that an increase in the size of each market promotes the division
of labor if the free-entry condition is not imposed.
26) Note: a decrease in  raises the eective number of varieties; i.e., as consumers values variety stronger
the eective number of varieties increases.
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4 Trade liberalization
We dene trade liberalization as a decrease in variable trade cost  or in xed export cost
fx or in specicity of xed export costs , or an increase in the number of trading partners,
n.27) Note that these changes are worldwide because all countries are symmetric. Then,
we consider an increase in n only in the case of  = 1, for analytical simplicity.28)
We can implement a comparative statistical analysis for trade liberalization as follows.
Proposition 6. Under Assumption 1 and 2, trade liberalization has impacts on equilibrium
allocation and social welfare as follows.
(I) Full entry regime
1. A decrease in  does not change nT , yT , tT , MT , and MW and raises VT .
2. A decrease in fx does not change nT , reduces yT and tT ,and raises MT ;MW ,and VT .
3. A decrease in  does not change nT , reduces yT and tT ,and raises MT ;MW ,and VT .
4. Under  = 1, an increase in n raises nT , yT , tT , and VT , and reduces MT . Then,
whether MW increases is ambiguous.
(II) Partial entry regime
Each of a decrease in  , fx, and  raises nT , yT , tT , and VT and reduces MT . Then,
whether MW increases is ambiguous.
Proof. See Appendix F for details. Q.E.D.
Theses results indicate that the division of labor is limited by the number of export
markets rms enter, no matter which regime is achieved. Under partial entry regime, that
the division of labor is essentially limited by trade costs.
The mechanism behind the above results is described as follows. To begin with, we
consider the eect on nT . Under full entry regime, a decrease in  , fx, and  raises entry
gain relative to entry loss but does not change nT because nT is bound at nT = n. In
contrast to this, an increase in n raises nT .
29) Under a partial entry regime, all these
27) For these changes in fx,  and n there are the examples as follows: A decrease in fx is brought about by
export promotion and deregulation. A decrease in  is brought about by the standardization of products,
regulations, and administration. An increase in n describes a situation in which some rising countries enter
an intra-industry trade market or in which some countries enter into a multilateral trade agreement.
28) We introduce an increase in n in such a manner that symmetry is maintained among countries. How-
ever, this is dicult. For example, symmetry is broken if all rms of incumbent countries must pay identical
xed export costs to enter new markets. For analytical simplicity, we consider an increase in n only in the
case of  = 1.
29) This is not trivial. When rms raise nT , they face a trade-o between an increase in total revenue
r = rd+nrx and total xed costs fd+n
fx. The former eect dominates the latter. Therefore, an increase
in n raises nT , concentrates labor on surviving rms, and promotes the division of labor.
15
changes raise nT because nT does not reach the upper bound. Ascending order of entry
costs plays a key role in this result.
Next, we consider channels in which changes in  , fx, , and n aect tT jn from tT jn =
lT jn=(2f). A change in tT jn depends on only lT jn. From lT jn = (fd+nfx)=B, lT jn directly
depends on fx, and  (direct eect). In addition, lT jn indirectly depends on  , fx, and 
through n (indirect eect). Under full entry regime, indirect eect is shut down except for
change in n. Hence, the results of Proposition 6 are dierent between the two regimes.30)31)
However, both regimes have the same mechanism in the sense that a direction of labor
reallocation eect across rms determines whether the division of labor is promoted or
refrained (See Proposition 10 of Appendix H). However, we should note that the direction
of labor reallocation across rms depends on rm's entry for export markets. In this sense,
ascending order of entry costs determining the number of markets rms enter plays a key
role in trade liberalization. The above results under partial regime can not be given by the
model of Chaney and Ossa (2013) because they does not assume ascending order of entry
costs and their markup rate does not depend on the number of rms.
Whether welfare rises depends on whether G(nT ) rises because VT = VAG(nT )
1=( 1).
All changes raise G(nT ) and hence raise VT (See Appendix F for details).
5 Conclusion
This study analyzes how trade promotes entry into export markets, the division of labor,
and changes rm productivity. Under positive xed export costs, free-entry conditions, and
constant markup rate, opening up to trade causes surviving rms to promote the division
of labor. The division of labor becomes stronger as the number of export markets that
rms enter increases; i.e., the division of labor is limited by the number of export markets
that rms enter but not by the size of each market. This result is in contrast with Adam
Smith's theorem and result of Chaney and Ossa (2013) that the division of labor is limited
by the size of each market. In Chaney and Ossa (2013), labor reallocation across rms
behind the division of labor promoted is based on the pro-competition eect.
Firms enter the export markets in the ascending order of entry costs. As trade costs
decrease, rms enter more export markets if the number of markets does not reach the upper
bound. Hence, the division of labor is essentially limited by trade costs. This implication
30) We consider eects of the parameters on lT and tT jt under full entry regime. A decrease in  does not
aect lT jn directly and indirectly. A decrease in fx and  shifts the FE curve of Figure 2 downward and
reduces lT and tT . A increase in n shifts the FE curve of Figure 2 upward and raises lT and tT
31) We consider eects of the parameters on tT jt under partial entry regime. A decrease in  raises n
and then raises lT and tT indirectly. A decrease in fx and  reduces lT and tT directly but raises them
indirectly. Indirect eect dominates direct eect and hence, a decrease in fx and  raises lT and tT .
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provides a new insight for Adam Smith's theorem.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Firm structure
Derivation of optimal core competency
While we treats core competency as exogenous variable, we treats this as endogenous
variable in this appendix.
Firms select core competency, !c, on certain task set [!; !]. Let lj!c(!; !) denote labor
input of task set [!; !] for producing one unit of preliminary good for given !c. Then,
lj!c(!; !) is given as follows:
lj!c(!; !) =
1
2
Z !
!
j!c   !jd!; !c 2 [0; 2];  > 0:
For minimization problem, l(!; !) = min!c2[!;!] lj!c(!; !), we rewrite objective function as
follows:
lj!c(!; !) =
1
2
Z !
!
j!c   !jd!
=

2
Z !c
!
(!c   !)d! +
Z !
!c
(!   !c)d!

=

2
 1
2

(!c   !)2
!c
!
+
1
2

(!   !c)2
!
!c

=

2

1
2
(!c   !)2 + 1
2
(!   !c)2

:
By minimizing l(!; !) with respect to !c, we can obtain the following rst order condition:
(!c   !)  (!   !c) = 0:
Let !cj[!;!] denote optimal core competency for task set [!; !]. Hence, we have optimal
core-competency as follows
!cj[!;!] =
! + !
2
: (A.1)
The optimal core competency is certainly the mid-point in the assigned task set. This is
because each task set is symmetric with respect to the core competency.
1
Derivation of lprejunit of (2)
By substituting !cj[!;!] for !c of lj!c(!; !), we can obtain the following equations:
l(!; !) =
1
2
Z !
!
j!cj[!;!]   !jd!
=

2
"
1
2

! + !
2
  !
2
+
1
2

!   ! + !
2
2#
=

2

!   !
2
2
:
l(!; !cj[!;!]) can be obtained as follows:
l(!; !cj[!;!]) =

2
Z !cj[!;!]
!
j!cj[!;!]   !jd!
=

4

(!c   !)2
!c
!
=

4

!   !
2
2
:
Hence, we can get
l(!; !) = 2l(!; !cj[!;!]): (A.2)
Because the teams are symmetric, identical range of task subset, [0; 2=t], is assigned to
each team and then, labor input of each reach is identical.
We can obtain lprejunit from the following calculation:
lprejunit =t l(0; 2=t)
=2t l(0; 1=t) by (A.2) and (A.3)
=2t 1
2
Z 1=t
0
!d!
=t
 Z 1=t
0
!d!
!
:
From
R 1=t
0
!d! = 1=(2t2), we can obtain t
R 1=t
0
!d!

= =(2t).
Generality of the technology in (1)
Next, We examine that how general and valid the technology which we adopt in equation
(1) is in comparison to the one adopted by Chaney and Ossa (2013).
The technology we adopted is dierent from the one adopted by Chaney and Ossa
2
(2013), in two points. Equation (1) in this paper corresponds to the equation of Chaney
and Ossa (2013) as follows:
l(!; !) =
1
2
Z !
!

! + !
2
  !

d!: (A.3)
Equation (A.3) and (1) are equal, when  = 1 in (A.3) and  = 1 in (1).
We examine a characteristic of parameter,  by seeing shape of l(!; !). For simplicity,
we assume  = 1 and t = 1. When  = 1, the integral term of the right hand side in
(A.3) corresponds to the area formed by "Benchmark Line" shown in Figure A.1. When
 > 1, the one corresponds to the area formed by "Curve H" shown in Figure A.1. When
0 <  < 1, the one corresponds to the area formed by "Curve L" shown in Figure A.1
implies that the eect of an increase in  is parallel to the eect of a decrease in .
Figure A. 1: comparison between sequential task structures
If we adopts the technology in (A.3), the equilibrium allocation are rewritten by:
lA =
2( + 1)  
  ( + 1) fd;
yA =

 + 1
  ( + 1)fd
+1

 + 1
1
f

;
MPLA = ( + 1)


 + 1

 + 1
  ( + 1)

fd
f

;
tA =


 + 1

 + 1
  ( + 1)

fd
f
:
The next table shows that the eect of an increase in  is parallel to the eect of a decrease
3
in  on certain conditions.
Table 1
lA yA MPLA
? 0 + only if tA > 1 + only if tA > 1
's amplication eect also occurs on certain conditions. Moreover, eect of f does
not change. Therefore, this suggests that the technology which we adopt does not loose
generality quite much in comparison to the one adopted by Chaney and Ossa (2013) .
Validity of the technology in (1)
Martins, Scarpetta and Pilat (1996) shows that almost all industries in OECD have markup
rate which belongs to set (1; 2). Therefore, the internal solution condition 2 <  does not
seems to have reality. This property highly depends on organization parameter . If we
adopts the technology in (A.3), internal solution condition is
 >  + 1:
Therefore, by assuming organization parameter  to be in (0,1), model's mark-up rate 
can be consistent with the empirical studies.
However, assuming  to be in (0,1) makes tractability of the model decrease. For
analytical simplicity, we assume  to be 1.
Appendix B: Shape of PPA curve and FEA curve in Figure 2
In this section, we examine shape of PPA curve and FEA curve in Figure 2.
We dene Z(y) as dierence between right hand side of PPA relation and of FEA
relation:
Z(y)  
2

2f
y
1=2
 
"
2f
y
1=2
+
fd
y
#
= B(2f)1=2y 1=2   fdy 1:
Certainly, Z(yA) = 0 holds.
The derivative of function Z(y) is given by
Z 0(y) =  2 1B(2f)1=2y 3=2 + fdy 2:
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When y = yA, Z
0(yA) = 0 holds, where y

A is given by
yA = 2
fd
B2f
= 4
fd
B22f
= 4yA:
From B > 0, when y < 4yA, Z
0(y) > 0 holds and when y > 4yA, Z 0(y) < 0 holds.
Furthermore, for the second order derivative of function Z(y), Z 00(64yA=9) = 0 holds.
The limits of function Z(y) are given by
lim
y!1
Z(y) = 0;
lim
y!0
Z(y) =  1:
The above relations are proved in the following manner.
Proof.
lim
y!1
Z(y) = lim
y!1
B(2f)1=2y1=2   fd
y
=
0  fd
1 ! 0;
lim
y!0
Z(y) = lim
y!0
B(2f)1=2y1=2   fd
y
=
 fd
0
!  1:
Q.E.D.
According to the above results, the shape of Z(y) is the one as shown in Figure A.2.
Figure A. 2: the shape of Z(y)
Figure A.2 is consistent to Figure 2 and hence, Figure 2 is supported.
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Appendix C: Derivation of optimal quantity-price rule on trading
equilibrium
In this section, we assume n as given. In open economy, home country's house holds have
preference represented by utility function:
U =
Z
2
c()d + n
Z
2
c()d
1=
; 0 <  < 1:
Utility maximization drives the following price index:
PT jn =
Z
2
(p())1  d + n
Z
2
[p()]1  d
1=(1 )
:
On trading equilibrium, all rms' prot are zero and then, each household's income contains
the only wage income. Consumption of domestic household for domestic and foreign brand
are respectively:
c = p d (PT jn)
 1w; c0 = (pd)
 (PT jn)
 1w: (C.1)
Consumption of foreign household for foreign and domestic brand are respectively:
c = pd
 (P T jn)
 1w c0 = (pd) (P T jn)
 1w: (C.2)
Prime represents consumption for import brand. The above equations show that the elas-
ticity of demand for price is  regardless of source countries.
From denition of iceberg cost  , export revenue is dened as rx  pxyx= . Since mill
price in export market is px = pd, export revenue can be rewritten as rx = pdyx= = pdyx:
Total revenue from all markets r = rd + nrx can be rewritten as r = pdyd + pdnyx = pdy.
Total prot from all markets  is
 = pdy   TC(y): (C.3)
Market clear condition for home country's brand is
y = Lc+ nLc0: (C.4)
(C.1), (C.2), and (C.4) derive
y = L[p d P
 1
T w] + nL
[(pd) P T
 1w]: (C.5)
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This shows that each rm faces individual demand curve whose elasticity of demand for
price is . From (C.3), and (C.5), prot maximization problem derives
PPjn : pd = MC(y):
Appendix D: Proof of Proposition 5.
Social Welfare in closed economy
We treat representative household's utility as a measure of social welfare. Under the utility
maximization, indirect utility function of each household is VA = (w=P )A. On equilibrium,
rms set identical price, p and from the denition of P , the following relation is given:
VA =

w
p

A
M
1
 1
A : (D.1)
Note that the indirect utility can be decomposed to real wage rate and the number of
varieties. We substitute (p=w)A and MA into (D.1) and consequently, obtain equilibrium
social welfare as follows:
VA = (2f)
 1L
1
 1 (B + 1)
 
 1B
2 
 1fd
 2
 1 : (D.2)
Social Welfare in open economy economy
In trading equilibrium, the real wage rates are identical in the all countries and hence, the
indirect function is given by VT = (w=P )T .
Consumers of home country face (nT=n)M brands on the average per one foreign coun-
try. Then, PT can be rewritten as follows:
P 1 T =
Z
2
(p())1  d + n
Z
2
[p()]1  d
=MTp
1 
d;T + n
nT
n

MT 
1 p1 d;T
=MTp
1 
d;T (1 + nT 
1 ): (D.3)
Since countries are symmetric, the social welfare is obtained by
VT =

w
pd

T

(1 + nT 
1 )MT
 1
 1 : (D.4)
By substituting (pd=w)T jn and MT jn into (D.4), we can obtain equilibrium social welfare as
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follows
VT = (2f)
 1L
1
 1 (B + 1)
 
 1B
2 
 1 (fd + n

Tfx)
 2
 1 (1 + nT 
1 )
1
 1 :
This expression is rewritten as
VT = VAG(nT )
1
 1 : (D.5)
Comparing VT of (D.5) to VA of (D.2), the following relationship is obtained:
VT > VA $ G(nT ) > 1:
Appendix E: Decomposition of gains from trade
Productivity eect is positive from Proposition 3. In the contrast to this, does the number of
the eective varieties increase through the opening up to trade ? The change in the number
of the eective varieties depends on parameters as follows. Then, we obtain Proposition 7.
Proposition 7. Under Assumption 1 and 2, gains from opening trade is decomposed to
productivity eect and eective variety eect.
(I) When fd > n
 1
T 
 1fx holds, both productive eect and eective variety eect are
positive.
(II) When fd > n
 1
T 
 1fx does not hold, eective variety eect is non-positive and
then, positive productivity eect dominates this eect and gains from opening trade exists.
Proof. (I) Productivity eect is positive from Proposition 3. The number of the eec-
tive varieties in the autarkic equilibrium is (MA)
1=( 1). Note that MW > (MA)1=( 1) is
equivalent to fd > n
 1
T 
 1fx. In fact, From MA and the denition of MW , we can get
MW
(MA)1=( 1)
=

(1 + nT 
1 )
fd
fd + nTfx
 1
 1
:
From this relation, fd > n
 1
T 
 1fx is equivalent to MW > (MA)1=( 1). Furthermore,
fd > n
 1
T 
 1fx is equivalent to  1 nT > nTfx=fd. Then, we can obtain
1 +  1 nT > 1 + nT
fx
fd
>

1 + nT
fx
fd
2 
:
Hence, fd > n
 1
T 
 1fx implies G(nT ) > 1. From G(nT ) > 1 $ VT > VA, VT > VA holds.
(II) We show that intersection of set of G(n) > 1 and complement set of fd >
n 1T 
 1fx is not empty. We assume  = 1,  = 3=2,  = 4, and fx=fd = 2. Then,
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1 < nT 
 1fx=fd holds from 1 < 41=22 = 4. n > 4 is equivalent to the following relation:
1 + 4 1=2n > (1 + 2n)1=2:
That is, I(nT ) > H(nT ) holds. Hence, there is a pair of (; ; ; fx; fd; n) such that satises
both G(nT ) > 1 and fd < n

T 
 1fx. Therefore, intersection of set of G(nT ) > 1 and
complement set of fd > n
 1
T 
 1fx is not empty. Q.E.D.
The condition fd > n
 1
T 
 1fx demands that trade costs (combination of  and fx)
and n are suciently low relative to fd and also that entry gain is suciently high and
entry loss is suciently low.
Appendix F: Proof of Proposition 6.
We present the proof of Proposition 6 by using results of Appendix L.
Property dyT=dn, dlT=dn, and dtT=dn under full entry regime
We can immediately obtain dyT=dn > 0, dlT=dn > 0, and dtT=dn > 0 by dierentiating
yT , lT , and tT with respect to n, respectively.
Property dMW=dn under full entry regime
From MW = [(1 + n
 1 )MT ]
1=( 1)
, we can obtain the following condition:
dMW
dn
=
M2 W
   1

d(1 + n 1 )
dn
MT + (1 + n
 1 )
dMT
dn

=
n 1( 1 fd   fx)
(   1)(fd + nfx) MTM
2 
W :
This condition implies
dMW
dn
> 0$ fd >  1fx: (F.1)
Hence, the eective variety eect is ambiguous.
Changes in welfare under full entry regime
We have VT = VAG(nT ) from (D.5). Note the following conditions are satised:
dVA
d
=
dVA
dfx
=
dVA
d
=
dVA
dn
= 0:
Hence, changes in VT depend only on changes in G(nT ).
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Change in  does not change nT and then, we can get.
dG(nT )
d
=
@G(nT )
@
+
dG(nT )
dnT
dnT
d|{z}
0
=
@G(nT )
@
:
In the similar manner, we can obtain dG(nT )=dfx = @G(nT )=@fx and dG(nT )=d =
@G(nT )=@. Then, we can obtain the following conditions:
@G(nT )
@
=  (   1) nT 
 
1 + nT
fx
fd
2  < 0;
@G(nT )
@fx
=  (2  ) (1 + nT 
 )n

T
fd
1 + nT
fx
fd
3  < 0;
@G(nT )
@
=  (2  )(1 + nT 
 )fx
fd
@nT
@
1 + nT
fx
fd
3  < 0;
where @nT=@ = n

T log nT holds.
These implies @VT=@ < 0, @VT=@fx < 0, and @VT=@ < 0. In a decrease in  , positive
eective variety eect and no productivity eect leads to an increase in welfare. In a
decrease in fx and , positive eective variety eect dominates negative productivity eect
and this leads to an increase in welfare.
A change in n changes nT . Then, we can obtain the following condition:
dG(nT )
dn
=
dG(nT )
dnT| {z }
+
dnT
dn|{z}
+
> 0;
where dnT=dn = 1 holds from nT = n and dG(nT )=dnT > 0 holds from Appendix L.
The above result is explained as follows. A increase in n raises both entry gain and
loss. Entry gain dominates entry loss. Hence, welfare increases. In other words, even if the
eective variety eect is negative, the positive productivity eect dominates the negative
eective variety eect and hence, welfare increases.
The relation between the change in lT jn and changes of the other endogenous
variables under partial entry regime
We consider the relation between the change in lT jn and changes of the other endogenous
variables in order to investigate an eect of trade liberalization.
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From production function, we can get
dyT jn
dlT jn
=
lT jn
f
> 0:
Under given n, t(y) = [y=(2f)]1=2 and y = l2=(2f) give tT jn = lT jn=(2f). Then, we can
get
dtT jn
dlT jn
=
1
2f
> 0:
Labor market clear conditions give MT jn = L=(lT jn + fd + nTfx). Then, we can obtain the
following condition:
dMT jn
dlT jn
=   L
(lT jn + fd + nTfx)2
< 0:
From the above conditions, we can the impacts of the change in  as follows:
dyT
d
=
dyT jn
dlT jn| {z }
+
dlT jn
d
;
dtT
d
=
dtT jn
dlT jn| {z }
+
dlT jn
d
;
dMT
d
=
dMT jn
dlT jn| {z }
 
dlT jn
d
:
We can pin down these directions by determining the direction of dlT jn=d . The similar
arguments hold the impacts of the changes in fx and . Hence, we check the directions of
dlT jn=d , dlT jn=dfx, and dlT jn=d in the following analysis.
Property of dl=d under partial entry regime
We dierentiate lT jn for  and we can obtain
dlT jn
d
=
dlT jn
dnT
dnT
d
: (F.2)
dlT jn=dnT satises
dlT jn
dnT
> 0: (F.3)
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How about dnT=d ? By calculating total dierentiation for (L.1) of Appendix L which
characterize nT and we can obtain
(   1) 2d + (2  )  1
(2  )a dnT =  
  1
(2  )
fd
fx
1
nT
dnT :
Rearranging this equation, we have
dnT
d
=  (2  ) (   1)
 2
[(2  )  1] + [(  1) fd
fx
n T ]
:
Partial entry regime demands    1 > 0 and (2   )   1  0. Hence, we can obtain
dnT=d < 0.
From dnT=d < 0, (F.2), and (F.3), we can obtain the following condition:
dlT jn
d
=
dlT jn
dnT| {z }
+
dnT
d|{z}
 
< 0:
Property of dl=dfx under partial entry regime
We dierentiate lT jn for fx and we can obtain
dlT jn
dfx
=
dlT jn
dnTfx
dnfx
dfx
=
1
B
dnfx
dfx
=
1
B

@nfx
@fx
+
@nTfx
@n
dnT
dfx

: (F.4)
By calculating total dierentiation for (L.1) of Appendix L which characterize nT and we
can obtain
(2  )  1
(2  ) dnT =  
1
(2  )
fd
n 1T
1
f 2x
dfx     1
(2  )
fd
fx
1
nT
dnT :
Rearranging this equation, we have
dnT
dfx
=  (2  )
1
(2 )
fd
f2x
n
 ( 1)
T
[(2  )  1] + [(  1) fd
fx
n T ]
< 0: (F.5)
We dierentiate nTfx for fx and we can obtain
dnTfx
dfx
=nT + fxn
 1
T
dnT
dfx
=nT + fx( 1)(2  )
1
(2 )
fd
f2x
n
 ( 1)
T
[(2  )  1] + [(  1) fd
fx
n T ]
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=  
 1(2  )
[(2  )  1] + [(  1) fd
fx
n T ]
< 0: (F.6)
From (F.4), (F.5), and (F.6), we can obtain the following condition:
dlT jn
dfx
=
1
B
0BB@@nTfx@fx| {z }
+
+
@nTfx
@nT| {z }
+
dnT
dfx|{z}
 
1CCA < 0:
Property of dl=da under partial entry regime
We dierentiate lT jn for  and we can obtain
dlT jn
d
=
dlT jn
dnTfx
dnTfx
d
=
1
B
dnTfx
d
=
fx
B
dnT
d
: (F.7)
By calculating total dierentiation for (L.1) of Appendix L which characterize nT and we
can obtain
(2  )  1
(2  ) dnT +
n
(2  )2d =  
  1
(2  )
fd
fx
1
nT
dnT   fd
fx
n T
(2  )
hnT

+ (  1)
i
d:
Rearranging this equation, we have
dnT
d
=   n
(2  )
1

+ fd
fx
n
 (+1)
T

nT

+ (  1)
[(2  )  1] + [(  1) fd
fx
n T ]
< 0: (F.8)
Rearranging (L.1) of Appendix L, we have
fd
fx
n T = (2  )  1 +
(2  ) 1
nT
:
By calculating total dierentiation for this equation and we can obtain
fd
fx
dn T = (2  )d +
(2  ) 1
nT
d + ( 1)n 2T (2  ) 1dnT :
Rearranging this equation, from (F.8) we have
dn T
d
=
fx
fd

(2  )

1 +
 1
nT

  dnT
da
n 2T (2  ) 1 > 0:
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Then, we can obtain
dnT
d
=
dnT
dn T
dn T
d
= ( 1)(n T )2
dn T
d
< 0: (F.9)
From (F.7) and (F.9), we can obtain the following condition:
dlT jn
d
=
fx
B
dnT
d|{z}
 
< 0:
Changes in the number of eective under partial entry regime
A change in  changes nT and then, we can obtain
dMW
d
=
(MW )
2 
   1
0BB@@MW@| {z }
 
+
dMW
dnT
dnT
d|{z}
 
1CCA ;
where dMW=dnT satises as follows:
dMW
dnT
=
d(1 + nT 
1 )
dnT| {z }
+
MT + (1 + nT 
1 )
dMT
dnT| {z }
 
:
Because dMW=dnT is ambiguous, dMW=d also is ambiguous.
A change in fx changes nT and then, we can obtain the following condition:
dMW
dfx
=
(MW )
2 
   1
dMW
dnT
dnT
dfx|{z}
 
;
Because dMW=dnT is ambiguous, dMW=dfx also is ambiguous. In the similar to this,
dMW=d also is ambiguous.
Changes in welfare under partial entry regime
The changes in VT depend only on changes in G(nT ) from VT = VAG(nT ) in the similar
manner to that of full entry regime.
A change in  changes nT and then, we can obtain the following condition:
dG(nT )
d
=
@G(nT )
@
+
dG(nT )
dnT| {z }
0
dnT
d
=
@G(nT )
@
;
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where dG(nT )=dnT = 0 holds from Lemma 2.
In the similar manner, we can obtain dG(nT )=dfx = @G(nT )=@fx and dG(nT )=d =
@G(nT )=@. Then, we can obtain @VT=@ < 0, @VT=@fx < 0, and @VT=@ < 0 in the
similar manner to that of full entry regime. Q.E.D.
Appendix G: Trading equilibrium in the short run and the market
size eect
Trading equilibrium in the short run
Up to the previous section, we have studied equilibria where rms can enter and exit freely
any markets. That is, these equilibria have time span in which entry and exit can be
adjusted. We call such a time span long run. In this section, we study trade equilibrium
in the short run in which the number of export markets rms enter, n, and the number of
rms, M , can not be adjusted. In particular, zero prot condition is not imposed.
We need this short run equilibrium to decompose eects of trade liberalization into
short run and long run eect. and prove Lemma 2 of Appendix J.
Market clearing condition for nal goods of home country rms is given by
y =Lc+ nLc0
=LIp d P
 1
T + nLI(pd;n)
 P  1T by (C.1) and (C.2)
=LIp d P
 1
T (1 + n
1 )
=LIp 1d M
 1: by (D.3) (G.1)
(G.1) derives total revenue of home country:
r = pdy = LIM
 1: (G.2)
Firms input (2fy)1=2 + (fd + nfx) units of labor and this derives the following total cost
function:
TC = w

(2fy)1=2 + (fd + n
fx)

: (G.3)
This equation and optimal pricing rule gives
pd = w(B + 1)(2f)
1=2y 1=2: (G.4)
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By multiplying both sides of equation (G.4) by y, we have
pdy = w(B + 1)(2fy)
1=2:
Rearranging this equation, we can obtain
w(2fy)1=2 =
r
B + 1
: (G.5)
(G.3) and (G.5) gives the following optimal total cost function of short run:
TC =
r
B + 1
+ w(fd + n
fx): (G.6)
We substitute (G.2) and (G.6) into  = r   TC and obtain
 =r   TC
=r  

r
B + 1
+ w(fd + n
fx)

=
B
B + 1
r   w(fd + nfx)
=
B
B + 1
LI
M
  w(fd + nfx): (G.7)
(G.7) and household's income I = w +M=L give the following conditions:
I
w
= (B + 1)

1  M(fd + n
fx)
L

; (G.8)

w
=
BL
M
  (B + 1)(fd + nfx): (G.9)
(G,1) and (G.4) gives
y =
[L(I=w)]2
(2f)[(B + 1)M ]2
: (G.10)
(G.8) and (G.10) gives
yS =

L
M
  (fd + nfx)
2
2f
: (G.11)
where subscript "S" represents variables in the short run trading equilibrium.
(G.4) and (G.11) gives
pd
w

S
=
(B + 1)(2f)
L=M   (fd + nfx) :
From (G.11) and production function y = l2=2f , we can obtain labor input on production
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divisions, l as follows:
lS =
L
M
  (fd + nfx); (G.12)
(G.12), production function and optimal team numbers t(y) = [y=(2f)]1=2 gives t in the
short run equilibrium as follows:
tS =
lS
2f
=
1
2f

L
M
  (fd + nfx)

: (G.13)
(G.13) gives Proposition 8.
Proposition 8. In the short run equilibrium of both regimes, an increase in market size L
promotes the division of labor within rms.
As Proposition 2, this gives rms excess prots. However, new rms enter in the long
run and then, zero prot condition is achieved.
Appendix H: Labor reallocation across and within rms behind
the division of labor promoted in trade liberalization
In this appendix, we consider labor reallocation behind the division of labor promoted in
trade liberalization by decomposing the eect of trade liberalization on the the division of
labor into the short run eect and the long run eect.
Trade liberalization in the short run
To begin with, we consider the division of labor caused by trade liberalization in the short
run.
From (G.13), comparative statics in the short run is obtained immediately in Proposi-
tion 9 as follows.
Proposition 9. In the short run equilibrium of both regimes, comparative statics for tS is
obtained as follows;
(I) A decrease in  does not change tS.
(II) A decrease in fx raises tS.
(III) An decrease in  raises tS.
(IV ) Under  = 1, an increase in n does not change tS.
We can explain a mechanism behind the above results form a view of labor allocation.
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(G.12) is equivalent to the following equation:
Total labor input per one rmz }| {
lS|{z}
production division
+ (fd + n
fx)| {z }
headquarter division
=

L
M

| {z }
constant
:
This means that there is no labor reallocation across rms by trade liberalization in the
short run because total labor input per one rm is xed at L=M . All labor reallocations
by trade liberalization in the short run are caused within rms.
A decrease in fx and  induce rms to increase labor input in production divisions
through the reduction of labor input in headquarter division. Then, they can promote the
division of labor. In the contrast with this, a decrease in  and n does not change labor
input in headquarter division and then, can not promote the division of labor. Note that a
increase in n does not change n in the short run under because n is xed in the short run.
Trade liberalization in the long run under full entry regime
In the long run, M and n also are endogenous. Then, the division of labor promoted by
trade liberalization can be decomposed into two eects, reallocation eect across rms and
reallocation eect within rms. Reallocation eect across rms indicates that the division
of labor promoted through changes in total labor input per one rms and the number of
rms. Reallocation eect within rms indicates that the division of labor promoted through
the another channel.
From (G.12), (G.13) and results of Proposition 6, we can obtain the following conditions
for full entry regime:
dtT
d
=
0BBB@
short run (0)z }| {
dtS
dlS|{z}
+
@lS
@|{z}
0
+
dtS
dlS|{z}
+
@lS
@nT|{z}
 
dnT
d|{z}
0
1CCCA
| {z }
reallocation within rms (0)
+
dtS
dlS|{z}
+
@lS
@MT| {z }
 
dMT
d| {z }
0| {z }
reallocation across rms (0)
= 0;
dtT
dfx
=
0BBB@
short run ({)z }| {
dtS
dlS|{z}
+
@lS
@fx|{z}
 
+
dtS
dlS|{z}
+
@lS
@nT|{z}
 
dnT
dfx|{z}
0
1CCCA
| {z }
reallocation within rms ({)
+
dtS
dlS|{z}
+
@lS
@MT| {z }
 
dMT
dfx| {z }
 | {z }
reallocation across rms (+)
> 0;
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dtT
d
=
0BBB@
short run ({)z }| {
dtS
dlS|{z}
+
@lS
@|{z}
 
+
dtS
dlS|{z}
+
@lS
@nT|{z}
 
dnT
d|{z}
0
1CCCA
| {z }
reallocation within rms ({)
+
dtS
dlS|{z}
+
@lS
@MT| {z }
 
dMT
d| {z }
 | {z }
reallocation across rms (+)
> 0;
and under  = 1,
dtT
dn
=
0BBB@
short run (0)z }| {
dtS
dlS|{z}
+
@lS
@n|{z}
0
+
dtS
dlS|{z}
+
@lS
@nT|{z}
 
dnT
dn|{z}
+
1CCCA
| {z }
reallocation within rms ({)
+
dtS
dlS|{z}
+
@lS
@MT| {z }
 
dMT
dn| {z }
 | {z }
reallocation across rms (+)
> 0:
Trade liberalization in the long run under partial entry regime
The next, we consider the decomposition for partial entry regime. From (G.12), (G.13)
and results of Proposition 6, we can obtain the following conditions:
dtT
d
=
0BBB@
short run (0)z }| {
dtS
dlS|{z}
+
@lS
@|{z}
0
+
dtS
dlS|{z}
+
@lS
@nT|{z}
 
dnT
d|{z}
 
1CCCA
| {z }
reallocation within rms (+)
+
dtS
dlS|{z}
+
@lS
@MT| {z }
 
dMT
d| {z }
+| {z }
reallocation across rms ({)
< 0:
This shows that the eect of labor reallocation across rms (negative eect) dominates the
eect of that within rms (positive eect).
We can obtain the similar relation for change in  as follows:
dtT
dfx
=
0BBB@
short run ({)z }| {
dtS
dlS|{z}
+
@lS
@fx|{z}
 
+
dtS
dlS|{z}
+
@lS
@nT|{z}
 
dnT
dfx|{z}
 
1CCCA
| {z }
reallocation within rms (+)
+
dtS
dlS|{z}
+
@lS
@MT| {z }
 
dMT
dfx| {z }
+| {z }
reallocation across rms ({)
< 0:
The term of reallocation within rms is positive from the following reason. This term can
be rewritten as follows from (G.12):
dtS
dlS
@lS
@fx
+
dtS
dlS
@lS
@nT
dnT
dfx
=
dtS
dlS

@lS
@fx
+
@lS
@nT
dnT
dfx

=
dtS
dlS|{z}
+
@lS
@nTfx| {z }
 
dnTfx
dfx| {z }
 
> 0:
Note that dnTfx=dfx < 0 is proved at (F.6).
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We can obtain the similar relation for change in  as follows:
dtT
d
=
0BBB@
short run ({)z }| {
dtS
dlS|{z}
+
@lS
@|{z}
 
+
dtS
dlS|{z}
+
@lS
@nT|{z}
 
dnT
d|{z}
 
1CCCA
| {z }
reallocation within rms (+)
+
dtS
dlS|{z}
+
@lS
@MT| {z }
 
dMT
d| {z }
+| {z }
reallocation across rms ({)
< 0:
The term of reallocation within rms is positive from the following reason. This term can
be rewritten as follows from (G.12):
dtS
dlS
@lS
@
+
dtS
dlS
@lS
@nT
dnT
d
=
dtS
dlS

@lS
@
+
@lS
@nT
dnT
d

=
dtS
dlS|{z}
+
@lS
@nTfx| {z }
 
dnTfx
d| {z }
 
> 0:
Note that dnTfx=d < 0 holds because (F.9) proves dn

T=d < 0 and hence, this implies
immediately dnTfx=d < 0.
Summary of the results
We can summarize the above results as follows.
Proposition 10. Under both regimes, the division of labor promoted by trade liberalization
can be decomposed into reallocation eect within and across rms. In all cases of  , fx, ,
and n, reallocation eect across rms dominates reallocation eect within rms.
In this sense, both regimes have the same mechanism for the relation between the
division of labor promoted and reallocation of labor.
A graphical intuition for a decrease in fx under partial regime
These properties seem to be novel. For a decrease in fx under partial regime, we can
get a graphical intuition as shown in Figure A.3 by decomposing the eect on marginal
productivity into three eects. Figure A.3 illustrates three production curves, PC 1, PC
2, and PC 3 (PC 4) , in (ltotal   y) space. ltotal is rm's total labor inputs. That is, ltotal is
dened as ltotal = l + fd + n
fx. Note that from this denition, l
total
T   (fd + nTfx) means
labor input of production division, lT . Let l
h be labor input of headquarter division. ltotalT;j
and lhj represent variables at j-th stage where j 2 f1; 2; 3; 4g. In the rst stage at the
initial equilibrium, we have each rm's employment and production which is represented
by point A on PC 1. In the second stage after fx decrease and before nT and MT changes,
we have that represented by point B. In the third stage after fx decrease and nT increases
20
Figure A. 3: production curve and the change in MPL.
and before MT changes, we have that represented by point C. In the forth stage after fx
decrease and nT increases, and MT decreases, we have that represented by point D.
The rst eect of a decrease in fx on marginal productivity is a transition from point
A on PC 1 to point B on PC 2. PC 2 means production function with lhT;2 = fd + n

T;2fx;2
where fx;2 < fx;1 and n

T;2 = n

T;1. In this transition, lT;1 increases by interval l
h
T;1l
h
T;2. This
indicates that in the short run, rms reassign labor of interval lhT;1l
h
T;2 from the management
division to the production division (lhT;2 < l
h
T;1) while keeping l
total
T;1 units of total labor
(ltotalT;2 = l
total
T;1 ). This reassignment eect on the number of teams and productivity is positive
as shown in Figure A.3 where the slope of the tangent increases.
The second eect is a transition from point B on PC 2 to point C on PC 3. PC 3 means
production function with lhT;3 = fd + n

T;3fx;3 where fx;3 = fx;3 and n

T;3 > n

T;2. Just after
fx decreased, all incumbent rms earn positive prot. This makes these rms enter more
markets (nT;3 > n

T;2) and reassign labor from the production division to the management
division (lhT;3 > l
h
T;2) while keeping total labor input (l
total
T;3 = l
total
T;2 ). This reassignment
eect on the number of teams and productivity is negative. This eect dominates the rst
eect. Hence, the slope of the tangent at point C is less than that at point A. To put
it dierently, in the long run, labor input of the production division decreases (negative
reallocation eect within rms).
The third eect is a transition from point C PC 3 (PC 4) to point D on PC 3 (PC 4).
At point C, all rms earn negative prot. This makes some rms exit and concentrates
workers on survived rms (ltotalT;4 > l
total
T;3 ). In this transition, lT increases by interval l
total
T;1
ltotalT;4 . This indicates that these rms succeed in recruiting new workers and assign them
jobs of production division. This concentration eect on the number of teams and produc-
tivity is positive as shown in Figure A.3 where the slope of the tangent increases (positive
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reallocation eect across rms).
A transition from point A to point C reduces labor input of production division by the
interval lhT;3l
total
T;1 (negative reallocation eect within rms) while a transition from point
C to point D raises labor input of production division by the interval ltotalT;1 l
total
T;4 (positive
reallocation eect across rms). Since the interval ltotalT;1 l
total
T;4 is greater than the interval
lhT;3l
total
T;1 , the slope of the tangent at point D is greater than that at point A.
The above results indicates that an essential source of the division of labor in the long
run is labor reallocation across rms (the recruiting competition for survival). However,
we should note that the direction of labor reallocation across rms depends on rm's entry
for export markets. In this sense, ascending order of entry costs determining the number
of markets rms enter plays a key role in trade liberalization.
Appendix I: Lemma 1 and the proof.
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 derive the following Proposition 4. In this section, we consider
Lemma 1.
Introduction of Lemma 1
Can the numbers of export markets that rms enter n are distributed ? The lemma as
follows indicates that the numbers of export markets that rms enter are not distributed
in a certain condition.
Lemma 1. All rms enter n export markets if and only if the following each of (I) - (IV )
condition is satised:
(I) (2  )  1 ^G(n) < 1,
(II) (2  )  1 ^G(n) > 1 ^ G0(n) = 0,
(III) (2  ) < 1 ^ G(n) < 1 ^ G0(n) = 0,
(IV ) (2  ) < 1 ^ G(n) > 1 ^ ,
where  is a condition that there is a unique  2 (0; 1) such that satises
a 1 = [I 0(n)=I(n)][H 0(n)=H(n)]

fd + n
fx

fd + nfx
 1
:
Note that G(n) > 1 holds if n is suciently high relative to trade costs,  and fx=fd.
Proof of Lemma 1
In this appendix, we examine whether n distributes or not on trading equilibrium.
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Consider two rm (rm a and rm b). Firm a and rm b enter not only the domestic
market and also enter na and nb export markets respectively.
Optimal consumption conditions and optimal pricing rules give
Lcd + naLc
0
Lcd + nbLc0
=
P  1T (1 + na
1 )Lwp d;a
P  1T (1 + nb 1 )Lwp
 
d;b
by optimal consumption
=
1 + na
1 
1 + nb 1 

(=2)[(2f)=yT ja]1=2
(=2)[(2f)=yT jb]1=2
 
by optimal pricing
=
1 + na
1 
1 + nb 1 

yT ja
yT jb
=2
: (I.1)
Firm i's good market clearing condition is given by yi = Lcd + niLc
0 where i denotes a
or b. This good market clearing condition and (I.1) gives
yT ja
yT jb
=

1 + na
1 
1 + nb 1 
2=(2 )
: (I.2)
From yT jn = (fd+nfx)2=(2fB2), rms' optimal pricing rules and zero prot conditions
give
yT ja
yT jb
=

fd + n

afx
fd + nb fx
2
: (I.3)
From (I.2) and (I.3), we can get
1 + na
1 
1 + nb 1 
=

fd + n

afx
fd + nb fx
2 
: (I.4)
We dene  2 [0; n
nb
] as na = nb. Using this , we can rewrite (I.4) as follows:
1 + nb
1 
1 + nb 1 
=

fd + n

b fx

fd + nb fx
2 
: (I.5)
Clearly,  = 1 satises (I:5) in any combinations of nb; ; fx, , and . Can the other values
of  satisfy (I:5) ? If only  = 1 satises (I:5), all rms enter the same number of markets.
Left hand side of (I.5) is linear for  and this is denoted by J(). Right hand side
of (I.5) is nonlinear for  and this is denoted by K(). A line represented by J() has
an intersection J(0) in (; J) space and a curve represented by K() has the following
intersection in (;K) space K(0).
When K(0) = J(0) holds,  = 0 also satises (I:5). Hence, in the owing analysis, we
exclude a case of K(0) = J(0).
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Property of K()
By dierentiating K(), we can obtain
dK()
d
= (2  )

fd + n

b fx
fd + nb fx
1 
nb fx

fd + nb fx
 1:
Furthermore by dierentiating dK()=d, we can obtain
d2K()
d2
=(1  )(2  )

fd + n

b fx
fd + nb fx
  
nb fx

fd + nb fx
 1
2
+(2  )

fd + n

b fx
fd + nb fx
1 
nb fx

fd + nb fx
(  1) 2
=(2  )

fd + n

b fx
fd + nb fx
 
nb fx

fd + nb fx
 2| {z }
+

2664[(2  )  1] nb fxfd + nb fx  + (  1) fdfd + nb fx| {z }
+ or 0
3775 :
When (2   )  1 holds,  > 1 holds from Assumption 1 (1 <  < 2). Then, when
(2  )  1 holds, we have d2K()=d2 > 0.
The other hand, when (2   ) < 1 holds, K 00() > 0 holds for  <  and K 00() 
holds for   , where  satises the following condition:
 =
  1
1  (2  )
fd
nb fx
:
In a case of (2  ) < 1
We consider a case of (2 ) < 1.  of (I.5) determines uniquely in the following manner.
When K(0) < J(0) holds,  has the unique solution only when J 0(1) = K 0(1) holds.
line J() and curve K() have the unique cross point, as is shown in Figure A.4. Line J
and curve K come in contact with each other at  = 1 and this point represents the unique
solution.
When K(0) > J(0) and k() > J() hold where  2 (0; 1) satises K 0() = J 0(),
these line and curve have the unique cross point, as is shown in Figure A.5.
In a case of (2  ) > 1
We consider a case of (2 ) > 1.  of (I.5) determines uniquely in the following manner.
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Figure A. 4: n's degeneration in a case of (2  ) < 1: Case 1
Figure A. 5: n's degeneration in a case of (2  ) < 1: Case 2
When K(0) < J(0) holds,  has always the unique solution as is shown in Figure A.6.
When K(0) > J(0) and K 0(1) = J 0(1) hold, these line and curve have the unique cross
point, as is shown in Figure A.7.
Rewriting the above results
We rewrite the above results by using I;H;G. Note the following relations hold:
J(0) =
1
I(nb)
;
K(0) =
1
H(nb)
:
Hence, K(0) > J(0) is equivalent to G(nb) > 1.
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Figure A. 6: n's degeneration in a case of (2  )  1: Case 1
Figure A. 7: n's degeneration in a case of (2  )  1: Case 2
A simple calculation gives
J 0() = nb
I 0(nb)
I(nb)
;
K 0() = nb
H 0(nb)
H(nb)
K()
1 
2   1:
Since  satises K 0() = J 0(),  can be characterized as follows,
a 1 =
I 0(n)=I(n)
H 0(n)=H(n)

fd + n
fx

fd + nfx
 1
:
By substitute  = 1 for J 0() and K 0() , we can get
J 0(1) = nb
I 0(nb)
I(nb)
;
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K 0(1) = nb
H 0(nb)
H(nb)
:
Hence, J 0(1) = K 0(1) is equivalent to I 0(nb)=I(nb) = H 0(nb)=H(nb).
We dierentiate G(nb) for nb, we can obtain
dG(nb)
dnb
=
I 0(nb)H(nb)  I(nb)H 0(nb)
H2(nb)
:
Hence, I 0(nb)=I(nb) = H 0(nb)=H(nb) implies G0(nb) = 0. Q.E.D.
Appendox J: Lemma 2 and the proof.
Introduction of Lemma 2
If all rms enter n export markets, when an equilibrium condition (II) in Denition 1 is
satised ? The following Lemma 2 answers this question.
Lemma 2. When Assumption 1 holds and the number of export markets each rm enters
is identical, an equilibrium in which all rms enter n export markets uniquely exists if and
only if the following condition is satised: 8n^ 2 [0; n]; n^ 6= n ^ G(n) > G(n^).
This lemma indicates that optimal n maximizes G(n). We can interpret this imme-
diately. The numerator of G(n), I(n) = (1 + n 1 ), and the denominator of G(n),
H(n) = (1 + nfx=fd)
2  can be interpreted as entry gain and entry loss respectively, as
explained in Appendix D. Therefore, it is natural that n maximizes G(n).
Proof of Lemma 2
In this appendix, we use subscript n, n^ which represents the number of export markets
rms enter.
We call non-deviation condition for a condition that a rm does not have incentive to
enter n^ 6= n export markets when all the other rms enter n export markets. This condition
certies existence of trading equilibrium. We shows non-deviation condition is equivalent
to G(n) > G(n^). That is, we show the following proposition:
For given n; 8M; 8n^( 6= n); [0 = n > n^]! [G(n) > G(n^)]:
From P 1 T = Mp
1 
d;n (1 + n
1 ), we can obtain the following short run prot of rms
entering n export markets in the same manner as (G.7):
n =
B
B + 1
LI
M
  w(fd + nfx):
27
On the other hand, prot of rms entering n^(6= n) export markets is derived in the following
manner.
Demands for this rms is
yn^ =Lc+ n^Lc
0
=LIpd;n^P
 1
T + n^LI(pd;n^)
 P  1T
=LIp d;n^P
 1
T (1 + n^
1 )
=p 1d;n^LIM
 11 + n^
1 
1 + n 1 

pd;n
pd;n^
 1
=p 1d;n^LIM
 11 + n^
1 
1 + n 1 

fd + n^
fx
fd + nfx
 1
:
This conditions give
rn^ = pd;n^yn^ = LIM
 11 + n^
1 
1 + n 1 

fd + n^
fx
fd + nfx
 1
:
Optimal pricing rule gives TCn^ =
rn^
B+1
+ w(fd + n^fx) and these conditions give
n^ =
B
B + 1
LI
M
1 + n^ 1 
1 + n 1 

fd + n^
fx
fd + nfx
 1
  w(fd + n^fx):
8M; 8n^( 6= n); [n > n^] holds for M in which n = 0 holds. That is, for such a M ,
0 = n > n^ holds. This condition is equivalent to
fd + n
fx =
B
B + 1
LI
wM
<
1 + n 1 
1 + n^ 1 

fd + n
fx
fd + n^fx
 1
(fd + n^
fx):
This condition is equivalent to G(n) > G(n^). Q.E.D.
Appendix K : Deviation condition and an interpretation of G(n)
We can interpret G(n), from deviation condition shown in the following way. In this
appendix, we use subscript n, n^ which represents the number of export markets rms
enter.
We call deviation condition for a condition that a rm has incentive to enter n^ 6= n
export markets when all the other rms enter n export markets. We shows deviation
condition is equivalent to G(n^) > G(n). That is, we show the following proposition: When
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P 1 T =Mp
1 
d;n (1 + n
1 ) holds, the following condition holds:
For given n; 8M; [n^ > n]! [G(n^) > G(n)]
As with the manner in proof of non-deviation condition of Appendix J, we can obtain
prots of each type of rm as follows
n =
B
B + 1
LI
M
  w(fd + nfx);
n^ =
B
B + 1
LI
M
1 + n^ 1 
1 + n 1 

fd + n^fx
fd + nfx
 1
  w(fd + n^fx):
From some M , n^ > 0 = n. This implies G(n^) > G(n).
Now, we can interpret this as follows. Though Lemma 2 demands G(n) must be maxi-
mized on equilibrium, the above result demands G(n) must be maximized o equilibrium.
Therefore, The numerator of G(n), (1 + n 1 ), can be interpreted as entry gain. The
denominator of G(n), (1 + n fx
fd
)2 , can be interpreted as entry loss.
Appendix L: Proof of Proposition 4
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 derive Proposition 4 as follows. To characterize of nT , we begin
with clarifying property of G(n).
Property of G(n)
From denition of G0(n), we can obtain following condition:
For n = 0, G0(n) satises
dG(n)
dn
jn=0 = [I 0(0)H(0)  I(0)H 0(0)]H(0) 2 =  1  > 0:
For n > 0, the following relations hold:
G0(n) > 0 $ I
0(n)
I(n)
>
H 0(n)
H(n)
$ 
1 
1 +  1 n
> (2  )
fx
fd
n 1
1 + fx
fd
n
$ 1
(2  )
1 + fx
fd
n
fx
fd
n 1
>
1 +  1 n
 1 
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$ 1
(2  )
fd
fx
1
n 1| {z }
A(n)
>  1 +
(2  )  1
(2  ) n| {z }
Q(n)
:
Let A(n) and Q(n) denote left hand side and right hand side of the above condition re-
spectively. This relation between curve A(n)and Q(n) derives sign of G0(n).
A case of (2  )  1
Figure A.8 describes the relation between A(n) and Q(n) in a case of (2  )  1.
Figure A. 8: The relation between A(n) and Q(n) under partial entry regime { A(n) R Q(n)
{
We can describe G(n) as shown in Figure A.9 from Figure A.8.
Figure A. 9: Optimal entry nT under partial entry regime { G
0(n) R 0 {
Then, nT of Figure A.9 satises G(n) > 1 of Lemma 1 and maximized G of Lemma 2.
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Hence, nT is characterized by
1
(2  )
fd
fx
1
n 1T
=  1 +
(2  )  1
(2  ) nT : (L.1)
Note Figure A.9 has a restriction, G0(n) < 0 on n.
A case of (2  ) < 1
In gure A.5,K 0() = J 0() impliesK 0(1) < J 0(1). From these property andK(0) > J(0),
we can obtain I 0(nb)=I(nb) > H 0(nb)=H(nb), and I(nb) > H(nb). This implies
G0(nT ) > 0; G(nT ) > 1:
Note that when  = 1 holds, A(n) is constant. Hence, in a case of (2  ) < 1, A(n)
can be constant. Then, we analyze the case of (2  ) < 1 in two dierent cases: where
 = 1 holds and where  > 1 holds.
A case of (2  ) < 1 with  = 1
When (2   )  1 and fd  (2   ) 1fx hold, the relation between A(n) and Q(n) is
described as shown in Figure A.10.
Figure A. 10: The relation between A(n) and Q(n) under full entry regime with  = 1:
Case 1 { A(n) = Q(n) {
Then, We can describe G(n) as shown in Figure A.11 from Figure A.10. From Figure
A.11, We nd ne  0. Hence, G is increasing for n  ne. This leads nT = n.
When (2  )  1 and fd < (2  ) 1fx hold, the relation between A(n) and Q(n)
is described as shown in Figure A.12.
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Figure A. 11: Optimal entry nT under full entry regime with  = 1: Case 1 { nc > 0 {
Then, We can describe G(n) as shown in Figure A.13 from Figure A.12. From Figure
A.13, We nd ne > 0. Hence, G is decreasing for n  n and increasing for n > ne.
In this case, nT is characterized in the following manner. When n < nc holds, G is
maximized at n = 0 for n 2 [0; n]. In this case, G(0) > 1 does not holds since G(0) = 1.
Therefore, When n > nc holds, nT does not exists.
On the other hand, when n > nc holds, nT = n since G is increasing for n  ne and
G(n) > 1 holds for n > nc. This leads nT = n.
Figure A. 12: The relation between A(n) and Q(n) under full entry regime with  = 1:
Case 2 { A(n) Q Q(n) {
The above analysis certies nT as the unique solution.
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Figure A. 13: Optimal entry nT under full entry regime with  = 1: Case 2 { nc < 0 {
A case of (2  ) < 1 with  > 1
Let n represents a n which satises A0(n) = Q0(n). We analyze a case of (2   ) < 1
with  > 1 in three dierent cases : where A(n) > Q(n) holds and where A(n) = Q(n)
holds and where A(n) < Q(n) holds.
Figure A.14 describes the relation between A(n) and Q(n) when A(n) > Q(n) holds.
Then, We can describe G(n) as shown in Figure A.15 from Figure A.14. In this case, n
maximizes G, G(n) > 1, and G0(n) > 0 holds. Hence, we obtain nT = n.
Figure A. 14: The relation between A(n) and Q(n) under full entry regime with  > 1:
Case 1 { A(n) > Q(n) {
Figure A.16 describes the relation between A(n) and Q(n) when A(n) = Q(n) holds.
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Figure A. 15: Optimal entry nT under full entry regime with  > 1: Case 1 { G
0(n) > 0 {
Note A(n) = Q(n) can be rewritten as
fd = fx

(2  ) 1    1
1  (2  )
 1
:
Then, We can describe G(n) as shown in Figure A.17 from Figure A.16. In this case, if
n is dierent from ne, n maximizes G, G(n) > 1, and G
0(n) > 0 holds. Hence, we obtain
nT = n unless n = ne.
Figure A. 16: The relation between A(n) and Q(n) under full entry regime with  > 1:
Case 2 { A(n) = Q(n) {
Figure A.18 describes the relation between A(n) and Q(n) when A(n) < Q(n) holds.
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Figure A. 17: Optimal entry nT under full entry regime with  > 1: Case 2 { G
0(n) = 0 {
Note A(n) < Q(n) can be rewritten as
fd < fx

(2  ) 1    1
1  (2  )
 1
:
Then, we can describe G(n) as shown in Figure A.19 from Figure A.18.
In this case, if n < ne1 , we can get nT = n immediately.
If G(n) > G(ne1) holds, n maximizes G, G(n) > 1, and G
0(n) > 0 holds. Hence, we
obtain nT = n unless n = ne. Q.E.D.
Figure A. 18: The relation between A(n) and Q(n) under full entry regime with  > 1:
Case 3 { A(n) R Q(n) {
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Figure A. 19: Optimal entry nT under full entry regime with  > 1: Case 3 { G
0(n) R 0 {
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